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CASES oN JuDicIL ADMNISTRATION. By Maynard E. Pirsig. St. Paul:
West Publishing Co., 1946. Pp. 1017. $8.50.
Tins is a valuable book. In no other single published volume can one find
collected as much important miscellaneous material bearing on the actual
doings of American courts and lawyers. It should stimulate courses dealing
with those vital subjects which have been largely neglected by many law
schools.
The sections relating to the jury and to the fallibility of witnesses are ex-
cellent. Also particularly good are the data as to "the organization of
courts," the selection of judges, and certain aspects of "reform." The matter
concerning "the doctrine of precedents" is superior to that available in many
case books, although, surprisingly, it omits the searching comments of such
brilliant legal thinkers as Wigmore, Gray, Cook, Llewellyn, Felix Cohen,
Green, and Yntema.'
Nevertheless, I laid the book down with a keen sense of disappointment.
Pirsig tells us that it is the fruit of experience gained from twelve years of
classroom use. Surely, in those twelve years, the gaps in this volume should
have become obvious. Its grave deficiencies sharply appear when one com-
pares it with the publisher's prospectus which says that it "deals with our
entire judicial system" including "its methods of operation"; that its purpose is
to "impart to the law student a better understanding of the institutions . . .
before which he will practice . . . ," and that "this type of training can be
acquired only in such a course" as this book offers; and that the book "con-
tains a direct approach" to the legal profession. 2 The book falls far short of
fulfilling those promises. I shall indicate a few of the points I have in mind.3
1. In the section on the administrative method, Pirsig sets forth a con-
siderable part of an article by Roscoe Pound, published in 1941. Pound,
1. See Wigmore, The Judicial Fundion, in the Preface to THE SciExcE oF LEAL
METoD (1917) at ..-- cxix; GRAY, THE NATURE AND SoncEs op = LAw (1921) 225;
LLEWELLyx, THE BRAMBLE BusH (1930) c. IV; GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY (1930); Yntema,
The Hornbook Metlwd and the Conflit of Laws (1927) 37 YALE L. J. 468, 4S0.
Lacking in Pirsig's book is any adequate consideration of the cosequences of regarding
the doctrine of precedent as founded upon a sort of "estoppel." See, e.g., Aero Spark Plug v.
B. G. Corp., 130 F. (2d) 290, 298 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942); dissenting opinion in Helvering v.
Proctor, 140 F. (2d) 87, 88, 91 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944); dissenting opinion in Commissioner v.
Hall's Estate, 153 F. (2d) 172, 174-5 (C. C. A. 2d, 1946).
2. Italics added.
3. Perhaps the book's defects strike me the more forcibly because I am at present en-
gaged in teaching a course at Yale Law School entitled Fat Finding, in connection with
which, before I saw Pirsig's volume, I had prepared a mimeographed course-book which
presents and discusses some of the same material.
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contrasting administrative agencies with courts and describing "checks upon
courts," said that, in public judicial records, ". . . one may find exactly
. . . what disputed questions of, fact and law were before the tribunal, and
how the questions of fact were determined-if by a jury, very likely by ques-
tions put by the court and specifically answered; if by a judge,,in the form of
special findings of fact. Likewise anyone can find from those records what
conclusions the court came to as to the applicable law, either in the form of
instructions to the jury or of findings by the court. Moreover, the judgment
of the court must respond to the pleadings, findings of fact and conclusions
of law, and any lack of consistency in these respects will be apparent on the
record. . . . Thus the materials for criticism of, and accurate judgment
with respect to, judicial decisions are always available and readily acces-
sible. . . . Recently there has been widespread assertion of a doctrine that
findings of fact and finding and application of law cannot be separated. For
the most part, this is a phase of the recrudescence of absolutism, conspicuous
in all parts of the world in the last decades. . . . In this country it is urged
chiefly by advocates of administrative absolutism. . . . Undifferentiated
findings of facts and finding and application of the law thereto is the method
of personal justice and mechanical modes of trial which characterize the
beginnings of legal order." 4
The student is thus informed by Pound that "the materials for criticism"
of court decisions are "always available," because almost every court deci-
sion is accompanied by "special findings of fact." That this statement is
patently wrong as to most jury cases-that Pound errs in saying that in such
cases "very likely" the jury has "specifically answered" questions put by
the court-the student will learn when he reads Pirsig's Chapter 4, The
Determination of Facts.
But nothing in this chapter of seventy-four pages, or elsewhere in the book,
will instruct the student that Pound is strikingly mistaken in saying that
judges sitting without juries invariably or usually make and publish "special
findings of fact" which provide the "materials for criticism and accurate
judgment with respect to judicial decisions. .. ." The truth is that many
jurisdictions do not require trial judges to publish special findings and that,
absent such a requirement, trial judges in most cases do not make or publish
4. Pound, For the "Minority Report" (1941) 27 A. B. A. J. 664, reprinted in Pirsig's
volume at 143, 147, 152-3. That Pound has not consistently maintained that position is
indicated by his endorsement of Orfield, Criminal Appeals In America (1939); see Introduc-
tion by Pound, and Orfield's statement at p. 85. As to Pound's perplexing shifts of position,
see Fa rx, IF MEN WEaiE ANGELS (1942) 332.
As to the inter-action of legal rules and findings of fact, see, e.g., Wurzel, Methods of
Juridical Thinking, in the volume, THE SciENCE OF LEGAL METHOD (1917) 366-9; Paul,
Dobson v. Commissioner: The Strange Ways of Law and Fact, 57 HARv. L. Rnv. (1944) 753;
Aero Spark Plug Co. v. B. G. Corp., 130 F. (2d) 290, 298 n. 26 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942); Perklns
v. Endicott Johnson Corp., 128 F. (2d) 208, 223 n. 60 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942).
See also dissenting opinion in Old Colony Bondholders v. N.Y.N.H. & H.R.R. -
F. (2d) - (C. C. A. 2d, Jan. 13, 1947) as to the "gestalt" aspect of decisions.
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them. Instead, the judges in such jurisdictions usually content themselves
with rendering laconic judgments without any explanation of their views of
the facts or the applicable legal rules. For the bar and the interested lay
public the consequence is that the means of criticizing these decisions are
even less available than in cases where juries return general verdicts. Yet a
student using Pirsig's book has no way of knowing that Pound's article has
seriously misinformed him.5 Since such a student will be unaware of how
frequently trial court decisions are unaccompanied by explanations, he will
not perceive the fallacy in the following assertion, made by Pound in an-
other article included in Pirsig's volume: "If rules and over-rigid stand-
brds sometimes hinder the judge and prevent the best solution of which he is
capable, they secure us against the well-meant ignorance of the weak judge
and are our mainstay against improper motives on the part of those who ad-minister justice. Oriental judges, bound by little or no law, are notoriously
corrupt.6 A judge tied down on every side by rules of law and the necessity
of publicly setting forth his reasons upon the basis of such rules cannot do
much for a corrupter, if he would." 7
2. Moreover, Pirsig's failure to bring out the fact that trial judges fre-
quently enter unexplained (laconic) judgments, seriously mars his chapter
on "the doctrine of precedents." Because of that failure, the chapter leaves
unconsidered a central problem: How can anyone ascertain whether a trial
judge, sitting without a jury, has or has not followed the precedents in
deciding a case if the judge gives no explanation of his decision? Such a
decision yields no clue as to what facts the judge found or what legal rules,
if any, he applied.
When such a decision is appealed, the reviewing court must guess the trial
judge's reasoning. Usually, where findings of facts are not required, the
upper court will affirm such a decision (1) if there was conflicting oral testi-
mony heard by the trial judge, and (2) if some acceptable legal rule sanc-
tioned by the precedents, taken in combination with some factual inference
which can reasonably be drawn from some of the testimony, will rationally
justify the trial judge's decision. But neither the appellate court nor anyone
else knows whether the trial judge reached or checked his decision in this
manner. That is, no one knows whether the trial judge's view of the facts was
that ascribed to him by the upper court, or whether, had he reported his view
5. If Pound were correct in asserting that, when courts make "undifferentiated find-
ings of fact and finding and application of law thereto," we have manifestations of "absolu-
tism" and "personal justice," then it would follow that today many judicial decisions,
because they do not differentiate findings of fact and legal conclusions, reek with "absolu-
tism" and smack of "personal justice."
6. But KocouREx and WXGMORE, FORMATIVE INFLUENCES OF LEGAL DEVEOwLonEN.T
(1918) vii-ix, discussing Mohammedan methods of dispensing justice, my: "A sympathetic
understanding of the oriental point of view is necessary to overcome the narrow prejudice
and the hasty judgment which would give an entirely erroneous View. .. "
7. Pound, Jstice According to Law (1913) 13 COL. L. REV. 696, found in Pirsig's
book at 14, 24-5.
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of the facts, his decision could have been sustained as one logically resulting
from an application of a valid legal rule to the facts as he found them. If he
had published his findings, and if they had been supportable by reasonable
inferences from part of the conflicting testimony, it might then have ap-
peared that he had applied an untenable legal rule. In that event, the re-
viewing court would have accepted his finding of facts (since he heard and
saw the witnesses), but his decision would have been reversed because he
had erroneously deviated from the precedents. But when he makes no dis-
closure of his belief about the facts, any such disregard by him of the prece-
dents remains unknown.8 In short, the lack of knowledge of the grounds for
many trial court decisions pokes a deep hole in the "doctrine of precedents." 0
But students reading Pirsig's book will be ignorant of that hole.
3. Closely related to the foregoing defects of Pirsig's book is its omission
of material adequately directing attention to the transcendent importance of
the trial judge, an importance which derives from the circumstances that
the overwhelming majority of cases are not appealed and that, in those that
are appealed, the trial court's express or imputed fact-finding usually con-
trols the appellate court's decisions. One misses quotations from Judge
Curtis Bok's books and regrets the absence of any comprehensive material
showing the effect of the "personality" of the trial judge on his findings of
fact, i.e., of his "un-get-at-able" idiosyncrasies which influence his reaction
to the witnesses. 10
4. Once trial court fact-finding is fully recognized for what it is-one of
the major factors in court-house government "-it will become clear that
trained skill in the process of finding facts is imperative if we are to have
competence and fairness in the administration of justice. For, if the facts as
"found" by the trial court do not approximate the "objective" facts of the
case-the facts as they actually occurred-the court's decision will be wrong
and unjust, no matter how impeccable are the legal rules applied by the
court. The "right" rule applied to the wrong facts-to facts which do not
match the actual facts--cannot produce a correct or just decision. Pirsig
helps the student to see how an innocent man may be criminally convicted
through errors in fact-finding by juries. But a mistake in fact-finding made
by a judge sitting without a jury in a civil case may ruin a man financially
or otherwise. Fact-finding, as it is a human process, will never be perfect,
infallible. But it should approach perfection as nearly as is humanly possible.
8. See dissenting opinion in LaTouraine Coffee Co. v. Lorraine Coffee Co., 157 F. (2d)
115, 119 at 123-4 (C. C. A. 2d, 1946); Frank, What Courts Do In Fact, 26 ILL. L. Ruv. at
658-72, 782-4 (1932).
9. Cf. Ricketts v. Pennsylvania R. R., 153 F. (2d) 759, 769 n. 46, second paragraph
(C. C. A. 2d, 1946); Frank, Sketch of an Influence, in the volume INTERPRETATIONS OF MOD-
ERN LEGAL PHiLosoPHIEs (1947) 189, 235-6; Frank, Book Review (1946) 59 HARV. L. Rrv.
1004, 1010-12.
10. See, e.g., In reJ. P. Linahan, Inc., 138 F. (2d) 650, 651 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944).
11. U.S. v. Forness, 125 F. (2d) 928, 942 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942); Green, The Duty Prob-
lem in Negligence Cases (1928) 28 COL. L. REv. 1014, 1037.
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From this it would seem necessarily to follow that high on Pirsig's list of
suggested reforms should be these: (1) Future trial judges should be care-
fully educated for the performance of their peculiar tasks. (2) Prospective
jurors should not merely receive "pep talks" from judges and "hand-books"
briefly describing their duties, but should be required to take a course in
school in which they will learn something of the difficult art of fact-finding.
One looks in vain for consideration of those suggestions in Pirsig's chapter
on "reform."
5. Although in this book there are a few items briefly discussing the tactics
and strategems of trial lawyers, they are scant. A "direct approach" to the
legal profession surely calls for extensive excerpts from such refreshingly
honest treatises as Goldstein's Trial Technique (1936) 12 and Longenecker's
Hints on The Trial of a Law Suit (1927).
6. Ten pages of WVigmore's Science of Judicial Proof are quoted. But why
not the highly significant passages in which Wigmore in effect admits that
he has proved a negative, i.e., that there is not, and almost surely never will
be, such a science because of what I would call the ineradicable "subjectiv-
ity" inhering in judicial fact-finding when the testimony is in conflict?
Surely Wigmore's negative conclusion is vital news for the future lawyer,
since it underscores the uncertainties of litigation and therefore of legal rights
and duties.
7. This volume bears the title, Cases on Jvdicial Administration. That is
a misnomer since the book wisely consists principally of excerpts from
books, articles and reports. However, one aspect of the "case book" concept
still has Pirsig in its grip. In an effort to avoid the characteristics of a "text
book," he seldom comments on the material, virtually never expressly states
his own positions on controversial questions." As a result, he creates the im-
pression that he agrees with the publisher that his book, or some similar
book, affords "the only" means of "understanding" the "methods of opera-
tion" of our "judicial system" and "a direct approach" to the legal profes-
sion. The reader-this reader, at any rate-is eager to know whether Pirsig
believes it necessary to tell his students that first-hand, "direct," observa-
tion of courts and lawyers at work constitutes an essential ingredient of such
understanding. If he does so believe I think he should say so, and not
merely orally in the class-room. In other words, his "case book" should, I
think, include more of what is contained in a first-rate text book like Paul's
Gift and Estate Taxation, which not only painstakingly records what the
courts have decided but also forthrightly and in detail states the author's
views and why he entertains them. Of course, as Pirsig remarks in his pref-
ace, "divergent views may legitimately be held" concerning "topics which
12. See Morgan, Bo6k Review (1936) 49 HARV. L. REV. 1387.
13. Perhaps he sometimes does so obliquely by his selections. Thus he devotes twelve
pages to a quotation from Pound's article, For the "Minority Report," which severely casti-
gates administrative agencies; but Pirsig merely cites, vithout quotation, the %vor's of
critics of that article.
19471
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
are controversial." But a pseudo-Jovian aloofness does not, as he suggests,
convincingly preserve an "analytical and critical approach." It is more
wholesome for the teacher honestly to avow at least a tentative attitude, at
the same time inviting the students freely to criticize it. A teacher should
not purport completely to suspend his judgment until Judgment Day, nor
even for twelve years.
8. Pirsig includes Millar's admirable piece, The Formative Principles of
Primitive Procedure,14 which compares "the principle of judicial investiga-
tion" with "the principle of party presentation." The latter principle largely
governs in our American legal system, more so than in England's today.
When Pirsig in his last chapter presents "methods of reform," he offers
nothing concerning the advisability of our moving considerably further in
the direction of something like "judicial investigation." 11 In a previous
chapter, Pirsig inserts a statement by a layman, Callison, criticizing the
legal profession because, among other things, it does not sufficiently supply
competent legal services at moderate prices to people with small incomes.10
The bar has begun to meet that criticism through "legal aid"' and "neighbor-
hood law offices." But what of the inability of the "under-privileged" to
meet the expenses of conducting investigations to obtain evidence without
which meritorious cases will often be lost? Material suggesting the possi-
bility of utilizing some sort of governmental investigation in such circum-
stances-thus supplying "white-collar justice"-is not even mentioned by
Pirsig. Thus his section on the "administrative method" contains no refer-
ence to the important innovation under the Chandler Act of 1938 by which
the S. E. C., an administrative agency, instead of entering orders subject to
judicial review, supplies invaluable evidence concerning corporate reorgani-
zations directly to the judge and the parties.'7 The extension of the idea
embodied in that new practice to other areas of judicial activities deserves
study.'8 For until we devise some way by which persons of modest means,
in litigation with those possessed of ample means, are able to obtain essen-
tial evidence, we will continue to have a legal system of which a layman, like
Callison, can legitimately say that it "makes justice a thing of purchase, of
barter and sale." 19
JERomE FRANIKt
14. (1923) 18 ILL. L. REV. 1. See also Millar's Introduction to ENGELMANN, HISTORY
OF CONTINENTAL CIVIL PROCEDURE (1927).
15. "Gulson says that, in litigation, 'one party or the other is always supremely inter-
ested in misrepresenting, exaggerating or suppressing the truth,' and lie speaks 'of the char-
acteristic dangers of deception and fraud to which judicial tribunals are exposed. . . .' It
would seem, then, that the courts should take all the precautions possible against being
misled." FRANK, IF MEN WERE ANGELS (1942) 126.
16. P. 824.
17. See FRANK, IF MEN WERE ANGELS (1942) 45-7.
18. See id. at 122-8. That Chief Justice Taft's thinking moved in that direction, see
WILLOUGHBY, PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION (1929) 33, 59, 206 n. 7.
19. See Frank, White Collar Justice, Sat. Eve. Post, July 17, 1943, p. 22, That article
suggests why "discovery" procedure will not do the trick, i.e., important evidence, needed
to win a suit, may not be in the hands of the opposing party. See also dissenting opinion in
U. S. v. St. Pierre, 132 F. (2d) 837, 840, 849 n. 40 (C. C. A. 2d, 1943).
t United States Circuit Judge, Second Circuit Court of Appeals.
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